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EQUALITY BEYOND THE THREE-PART 
TEST: EXPLORING AND EXPLAINING THE 
INVISIBILITY OF TITLE IX’S EQUAL 
TREATMENT REQUIREMENT 
ERIN E. BUZUVIS & KRISTINE E. NEWHALL 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, Adrian College in Adrian, Michigan, unveiled its brand new $6.5 
million Multi-sport Performance Stadium.  The new stadium meant that the 
Adrian College Bulldogs football team, which competes in the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) Division III, would no longer have 
to share the town high school’s stadium, as it had been doing since the 1960s.1  
Though the college described it as a multi-sport facility, the current athletic 
department web page only speaks of its use as a football stadium, for football-
related events like alumni gatherings on game days, and for its soccer and 
lacrosse teams.2  What is clear, though, is that it was never intended for use by 
female student-athletes.  The facility has no women’s locker room.3  
This was one of the issues brought to the attention of the administration 
via two separate complaints anonymously filed in 2007 with the Department 
of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR).  The complaints detailed the 
unequal treatment between the men’s and women’s programs, which included 
access to and quality of facilities, publicity, quality of coaching, equipment, 
access to quality competition, scheduling, recruitment, and access to medical 
personnel, as well as disparities in the number of athletic opportunities 
provided to members of each sex.  But the lack of a women’s locker room in 
the new stadium attracted the most attention.  When the complaint became 
 
          Professor of Law, Western New England University. 
        Doctoral Candidate, University of Iowa Department of Women’s Studies.  The authors are the 
founders and co-contributors to The Title IX Blog, http://title-ix.blogspot.com. 
1. Multi-sport Performance Stadium, ADRIANBULLDOGS.COM, http://www.adrianbulldogs.com/ 
facilities/performance (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
2. Id. 
3. David Jesse, Adrian College Must Improve Sports Facilities for Female Athletes, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, Sept. 17, 2011, http://www.ongo.com/v/1864446/-1/EAF6984983D5B3D6/adrian-
college-must-improve-sports-facilities-for-female-athletes. 
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public, the college’s executive vice president, Rick Creehan, said that the 
absence of a women’s locker room in the complex was an “oversight.”4  
Title IX’s implementing regulations clearly require equal treatment in a 
variety of program areas, including access to facilities, and OCR 
unsurprisingly determined that Adrian College’s “oversight,” as well as the 
other alleged inequities, violated the law.5  To avoid losing its federal funding, 
as part of a resolution agreement, Adrian College had to add a locker room and 
provide women’s teams with equal access to the facility, as well as remediate 
the other violations the agency had found.6  The story of this egregious 
violation and its expensive remediation raises a compelling question: Why did 
this happen?  Forty years after Congress passed Title IX, the law prohibiting 
sex discrimination in federally-funded educational institutions,7 and in an era 
where Title IX’s application to athletics is the subject of litigation, agency 
enforcement, and media attention on a daily basis, how did administrators at 
Adrian College not realize that they had a legal obligation to provide equal 
treatment to its student-athletes of both sexes?  Title IX’s implementing 
regulations clearly require athletic departments to not only provide a quantity 
of athletic opportunities that are equitable to both sexes (the “equal 
opportunity” requirement),8 but it also requires those opportunities to be equal 
in quality, as measured by access to facilities, quality of coaching, uniforms, 
equipment, publicity, tutoring, medical trainers, and other amenities (called the 
“equal treatment” requirement).9  One cannot imagine that Adrian College 
would construct a facility without ensuring it was compliant with the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, another statute that protects civil rights.10  
And yet, it clearly did not consider how to make its new athletic facility Title 
IX compliant.  
Adrian College is one example of schools’ lack of knowledge about Title 
IX’s equal treatment mandate.  This is despite the abundance of equal 
treatment violations that students, parents, administrators, coaches, and 
community members are reporting every week.  The visibility of these 
complaints, though, remains low, especially in comparison to the publicity 
 
4. Id.  
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2011). 
8. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2011) (requiring schools to offer a “selection of sports and levels of 
competition effectively accommodat[ing] the interests and abilities of members of both sexes”). 
9. Id. § 106.41(c)(2)–(10) (requiring equity in such qualitative factors as access to facilities and 
equipment, scheduling, coaching, publicity and promotion, and other aspects of athletic participation). 
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2011). 
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around Title IX’s equal opportunity regulation,11 which is measured by the 
controversial three-part test.12  Early work on “Title IX literacy” within 
athletic departments provides tentative confirmation of this point; in a survey 
of nearly 1100 college coaches, a significantly higher percentage (70%) knew 
that Title IX required equal opportunity as measured by the three-part test than 
the percentage of respondents (38%) who knew that a school’s use of private 
funds—such as those raised by booster clubs—is not a defense for unequal 
treatment (the only question asked to test literacy about equal treatment).13 
Equal treatment is also under-examined in the academic literature, as 
scholars have focused significantly more research attention on Title IX’s equal 
opportunity mandate and the three-part test.14  This scholarship has 
 
11. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1). 
12. A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, 
DEP’T OF EDUC. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979),  available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices 
/list/ocr/docs/t9interp.html [hereinafter 1979 Policy Interpretation].  According to the 1979 Policy 
Interpretation, compliance with equal opportunity can be measured in any one of three ways:  
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students 
are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or  
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among 
intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice 
of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and 
abilities of the members of that sex; or  
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, 
and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program expansion such as that 
cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members 
of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program. 
Id. at 71,418. 
13. Ellen J. Staurowsky & Erianne A. Weight, Title IX Literacy: What Coaches Don’t Know and 
Need to Find Out, 4 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 190 (2011).  
14. See, e.g., Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road 
Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 51 (1996); Erin E. 
Buzuvis, Survey Says . . . A Critical Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a Proposal for Reform, 
91 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2006); Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University’s Defense 
to a Title IX Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on 
Student Body Ratios, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 845 (1994); A. Jerome Dees, Access or Interest: 
Why Brown Has Benefited African-American Women More Than Title IX, 76 UMKC L. REV. 625 
(2008); A. Jerome Dees, Do the Right Thing: A Search for an Equitable Application of Title IX in 
Historically Black Colleges and University Athletics, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 219 (2004); Sara A. Elliott 
& Daniel S. Mason, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: An Alternative Model to Achieving 
Title IX Compliance, 11 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 1 (2001); Thomas S. Evans, Title IX and 
Intercollegiate Athletics: A Primer on Current Legal Issues, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1996); B. 
Glenn George, Who Plays and Who Pays: Defining Equality in Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 WIS. L. 
REV. 647 (1995); B. Glenn George, Forfeit: Opportunity, Choice, and Discrimination Theory Under 
Title IX, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2010); C. Peter Goplerud, III, Title IX: Part Three Could Be 
the Key, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 123 (2003); Mary W. Gray, The Concept of Substantial 
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contributed to a greater understanding of the equal opportunity provision, 
including debunking myths around equal opportunity and analyzing the 
backlash against Title IX.  In comparison, however, the scholarship addressing 
equal treatment in athletics has been minimal.15  This Article is an effort to 
add to this scholarship in order to provide a greater understanding of equal 
treatment provisions. 
 
Proportionality in Title IX Athletics Cases, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 165 (1996); Rich 
Haglund, Staring Down the Elephant: College Football and Title IX Compliance, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 
439 (2005); Robert R. Hunt, Implementation and Modification of Title IX Standards: The Evolution of 
Athletics Policy, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 51 (1999); Julia Lamber, Intercollegiate Athletics: The 
Program Expansion Standard Under Title IX’s Policy Interpretation, 12 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 31 (2002); Daniel R. Marburger & Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Is Title IX Really to 
Blame for the Decline in Intercollegiate Men’s Nonrevenue Sports?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 65 
(2003); Catherine Pieronek, An Analysis of the New Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy 
Regarding Part Three of the Three-Part Test for Compliance with the Effective Accommodation 
Guidelines of Title IX, 32 J.C. & U.L. 105 (2005); J. Brad Reich, All the [Athletes] Are Equal, But 
Some Are More Equal than Others: An Objective Evaluation of Title IX’s Past, Present, and 
Recommendations for Its Future, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 525 (2003); Gary R. Roberts, Essay, 
Evaluating Gender Equity Within the Framework of Intercollegiate Athletics’ Conflicting Value 
Systems, 77 TUL. L. REV. 997 (2003); Jocelyn Samuels & Kristen Galles, In Defense of Title IX: Why 
Current Policies Are Required to Ensure Equality of Opportunity, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 11 
(2003); Suzanne Sangree, The Secretary’s Commission on Opportunity in Athletics Squandered Its 
Opportunity to Understand Commercial Collegiate Sports: Why They Eliminate Minor Men’s Sports 
and Prevent Title IX from Achieving Full Gender Equality, 3 MARGINS 257 (2003); Honorable 
Donald E. Shelton, Equally Bad Is Not Good: Allowing Title IX “Compliance” by the Elimination of 
Men’s Collegiate Sports, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 253 (2001); Rodney K. Smith, Solving the Title 
IX Conundrum with Women’s Football, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1057 (1997); Ellen J. Staurowsky, Title IX 
and College Sport: The Long Painful Path to Compliance and Reform, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95 
(2003); Michael Straubel, Gender Equity, College Sports, Title IX and Group Rights: A Coach’s 
View, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1039 (1996); Ellen J. Vargyas, Gender Equity and Athletics: Governing 
Legal Standards and Practical Applications, 2 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 74 (1992); Roy Whitehead 
et al., Gender Equity in Athletics: Should We Adopt a Non-Discriminatory Model?, 30 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 223 (1999); John C. Weistart, Can Gender Equity Find a Place in Commercialized College 
Sports?, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 191 (1996); Darryl C. Wilson, Parity Bowl IX: Barrier 
Breakers v. Common Sense Makers The Serpentine Struggle for Gender Diversity in Collegiate 
Athletics, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 397 (1996–1997); Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: 
Is Title IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions 
Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731 (2003); Perry A. Zirkel, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: 
Wrestling with Elephants?, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 437 (2005).  Countless student notes, not included in this 
footnote, have also addressed some aspect of the three-part test.  
15. See, e.g., Anne Bloom, Financial Disparity as Evidence of Discrimination Under Title IX, 2 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5 (1995); Patricia A. Cervenka, Free Shoes for Primary and Secondary 
Schools: Playing by the Rules of Title IX, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 285 (2006); Neena K. Chaudhry 
& Marcia D. Greenberger, Seasons of Change: Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School 
Athletic Association, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2003); Mark Kelman, (Why) Does Gender Equity in 
College Athletics Entail Gender Equality?, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 63 (1997); Brian A. 
Snow & William E. Thro, Still on the Sidelines: Developing the Non-Discrimination Paradigm Under 
Title IX, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (1996).  
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It is clear from the proliferation of cases and complaints challenging 
programmatic disparities in school and college athletic programs that Title 
IX’s goal of equal treatment has not been fully realized.  This Article 
examines why many school officials administer athletic departments in 
apparent oblivion to Title IX’s equal treatment mandate.  Section II provides 
the history of Title IX’s equal treatment provisions and their enforcement at 
the high school and collegiate levels since the 1970s.  The Section also 
discusses trends in the types of equal treatment violations and the success of 
both public and private enforcement.  Section III analyzes why the equal 
treatment mandate remains largely absent from the public discourse about 
Title IX through a discussion of the political philosophy and climate in the 
United States, constructions of masculinity, and the role of amateurism in 
sport.  Finally, Section IV offers recommendations to address the relative 
invisibility of Title IX’s equal treatment mandate with the goal of facilitating 
greater enforcement of equal treatment provisions and improving the overall 
equality of athletics.  
II.  TITLE IX’S EQUAL TREATMENT STANDARD: BACKGROUND AND 
ENFORCEMENT TRENDS 
After first looking at the development of Title IX’s equal treatment 
standard, this Section will examine current trends in its enforcement. 
A.  Early Development of Title IX’s Equal Treatment Standard 
After Congress passed Title IX in 1972, women’s sports advocates 
realized the law’s potential to remedy the gross gender inequities in 
intercollegiate athletics and made a concerted and deliberate push to use the 
law to increase the number of opportunities for female student-athletes.16  
Their priority of growing women’s athletics by leveraging the law as a 
mandate for equal opportunity has influenced both activism and the public 
discourse for decades.  Equal opportunity cases have been organized, highly 
visible, and prevalent in the intercollegiate context, and Title IX’s success and 
potential as an equal opportunity law is its most widely-touted attribute.17  
 
16. See DEBORAH L. BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN’S SPORTS 
REVOLUTION 144 (2010); see also 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 12, at 71,413 (noting that it 
received nearly 100 complaints under the 1975 implementing regulations, raising the central question 
of whether a school was providing enough opportunities for female students, which suggested that 
equal opportunity was a major concern of womens sports advocates in the early years of Title IX). 
17. In 1971, the year before Congress passed Title IX, 294,015 girls played high school sports 
compared to over 3 million today.  At the college level, participation rates have increased as well.  
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Yet, perhaps less well-known is the vital role that Title IX has played in 
ensuring equal treatment for girls and women’s sports, even from the earliest 
days of the law.  
Indeed, one of the most iconic images associated with Title IX’s history 
conveys that equal treatment was on the minds—and in this case, the bodies—
of female athletes, administrators, and their advocates from the beginning of 
the Title IX era.  In 1976, nineteen members of the Yale women’s crew team 
took off their shirts, painted “Title IX” across their bodies, and marched into 
the associate athletic director’s office to demand equal treatment.18  Their 
activism was born of frustration with their own experience with unequal 
treatment; the team had spent many cold mornings sitting on a bus after 
morning workouts wet from the water and their own sweat.19  They were 
waiting for the men’s team to shower and change in their own dedicated 
facilities.20  The women had no such facilities and, so, were, at best, freezing 
and inconvenienced in ways the men were not and, at worst, catching colds, 
pneumonia, and other illnesses.  They knew about Title IX.  They knew the 
law required equal treatment, and they demanded and received it.  Their story 
is famous because the Yale rowers drew attention to their plight through the 
use of media.21  Unfortunately, there is no way to determine how many similar 
incidents took place in athletic departments all over the country during the 
1970s.  How many less dramatic and less public complaints were offered by 
student-athletes, coaches, and athletic administrators to their athletic directors 
or university administrators?  There were complaints filed with the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) (then responsible for 
the implementation and oversight of Title IX), though how many were devoted 
to or included equal treatment claims is unknown.22  
Despite these empirical gaps, it is known that within athletic departments, 
women were requesting better treatment for their teams, including requests for 
 
See PLAY FAIR: A TITLE IX PLAYBOOK FOR VICTORY 4 (Women’s Sports Found. ed., 2009).  In 
1971, there were just under 30,000 female athletes participating at the college level.  Id.  Today, in the 
NCAA alone (i.e., not accounting for female athletes associated with other athletic conferences like 
the NAIA), that number is over 182,000.  NCAA, 1981–82  – 2008–09 NCAA SPORTS SPONSORSHIP 
AND PARTICIPATION RATES REPORT 65 (2010). 
18. A HERO FOR DAISY (50 Eggs Productions 1999). 
19. See id. 
20. See id. 
21. Yale Women Strip to Protest a Lack of Crew’s Showers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1976, at 33; 
Yale Women Crew to Get Locker Rooms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1976, at 41. 
22. Also, in 1975, HEW said that it would not investigate individual complaints, but that it would 
wait until there was a “pattern of complaints” at a given institution.  MARY JO FESTLE, PLAYING 
NICE: POLITICS AND APOLOGIES IN WOMEN’S SPORTS 172 (1996).  
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facilities improvements, while younger students—with the help of their 
parents—leveraged the law to improve the conditions for girls high school 
sports, as well.  Moreover, evidence of activists’ early commitment to, and 
concern for, equal treatment is reflected in the many versions of regulations 
and guidelines that HEW devised and revised during the 1970s, particularly 
the 1975 implementing regulations and the 1979 Policy Interpretation.  
Though the three-prong test, which has caused so much controversy, emerged 
from the 1979 Policy Interpretation, most of HEW’s efforts to implement Title 
IX in athletics focused on equal treatment.23  For instance, after a vociferous 
public comment period,24 HEW revised its draft regulations25 to ensure that 
the final regulations included more specific language requiring equal treatment 
for women’s sportsa so-called “laundry list”26 of factors, consisting of 
equipment, playing facilities, locker rooms, training and dining facilities, 
coaching, tutoring, medical care, publicity, scheduling of games and practices, 
and other factors that HEW later interpreted to include recruiting and support 
services.27  The fact that the regulations listed these program areas under the 
 
23. Recognition of and advocacy for equal treatment also came from within Congress.  Senator 
Birch Bayh, one of the initial sponsors of Title IX, defended the regulations, noting that they did not 
require equal scholarship dollars, provision of specific sports for women, or equal expenditures, only 
that when offering separate teams, “the institution is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of 
sex in providing the necessary supplies or equipment.” He offered as an example of unfair treatment 
under the regulations a school that pays for the uniforms of its basketball team but requires the 
women to buy their own.  Prohibition of Sex Discrimination, 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Educ. of the S. Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Sen. Birch 
Bayh) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearings]. 
24. HEW received more than 10,000 comments on the draft regulations, prompting then-
Secretary Casper Weinberger to quip that college sports must be “the most important issue in the 
United States today.”  Nancy Hogshead & Andrew Zimbalist, Introduction to EQUAL PLAY: TITLE IX 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 51–52 (Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Andrew Zimbalist, eds. 2007) [hereinafter 
EQUAL PLAY].  
25. The draft regulations, released in 1974, said that institutions should make affirmative efforts 
to “[p]rovide support and training activities for members of [the underrepresented] sex designed to 
improve and expand their capabilities and interests to participate in such opportunities.”  Education 
Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefitting from Federal Financial Assistance, 39 Fed. Reg. 
22,228, 22,236 (June 20, 1974) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86).  
26. See, e.g., SUSAN WARE, TITLE IX: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 50 (2007) (using the 
term “laundry list”). 
27. FESTLE, supra note 22, at 171.  The implementing regulations provide that:  
In determining whether equal opportunities are available the Director will consider, 
among other factors: (1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition 
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes; (2) The 
provision of equipment and supplies; (3) Scheduling of games and practice time; (4) 
Travel and per diem allowance; (5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic 
tutoring; (6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) Provision of locker 
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subheading “equal opportunity” suggests that HEW viewed schools’ 
obligation to equalize the number of participation opportunities as inclusive of, 
and in tandem with, their obligation to ensure equal treatment.28  
HEW’s 1979 Policy Interpretation, meant to clarify the agency’s 
expectations for compliance, is best known for including the controversial 
three-part test, which offered schools three ways to measure compliance with 
the regulations’ requirement to offer a “selection of sports and levels of 
competition [to] effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of 
members of both sexes.”29  But the agency also responded to comments it had 
received on the policy’s draft, which included letters outlining the inequitable 
treatment female student-athletes received (even when they played for 
nationally-ranked teams), as well as testimony about dangerous conditions in 
women’s facilities, the lack of women’s practice times and funding for travel, 
and the practice of requiring female college athletes to purchase their own 
equipment.30  Addressing these concerns, the Policy Interpretation also 
reinforced the mandate that schools must provide equal or equivalent 
treatment to members of both sexes in the quality of those athletic 
opportunities, in the program areas mentioned above, and in everything from 
“provision of equipment and supplies”31 to “[p]ublicity.”32  By separating out 
these program-area requirements under a separate heading, “B. Equivalence in 
Other Athletic Benefits and Opportunities,” the 1979 Policy Interpretation is 
the first to signal equal treatment and equal opportunity as separate 
components of Title IX.33  The Policy Interpretation clarifies that HEW will 
 
rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) Provision of medical and training facilities 
and services; (9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; [and] (10) 
Publicity. 
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2011).  The implementing regulations also contain a separate provision 
addressing athletic scholarships, which requires institutes that award athletic scholarships to “provide 
reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of each sex in proportion to the number of 
students of each sex participating in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics.”  Id. § 106.37 (c)(1). 
28. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).  HEW’s concern about equal treatment is also evidenced by the 
agency’s solicitation of Margaret Dunkle at the Resource Center on Sex Roles in Education to write a 
manual for schools, that, at that point, had received a three-year grace period for compliance, 
detailing how equal opportunity through the provision of equal treatment measures has been denied 
and offering specific strategies for remedying the discrepancies.  Margaret Dunkle, Competitive 
Athletics: In Search of Equal Opportunity (1976), in WARE, supra note 26, at 64–68. 
29. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1).  
30. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 23.    
31. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2). 
32. Id. § 106.41(c)(10).   
33. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 12, at 71,417. 
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find institutions in compliance “if the compared program components are 
equivalent, that is, equal or equal in effect.”34  If program components are not 
equal, a disparity must be due to a nondiscriminatory factor, such as the 
“unique aspects of particular sports” or fluctuations in the needs of various 
teams.35  The Policy Interpretation also provides three alternative grounds on 
which the agency could render a finding of noncompliance, including: (a) 
institutional policies that are discriminatory in language or effect; (b) 
substantial and unjustified disparities in treatment to male and female athletes 
“in the institution’s program as a whole”; or (c) disparities in treatment in 
individual segments of the program that “are substantial enough in and of 
themselves to deny equality of athletic opportunity.”36  
B.  Contemporary Enforcement of Title IX’s Equal Treatment Mandate 
Because HEW spent the majority of the 1970s drafting, revising, and 
clarifying regulations and offering grace periods for compliance,37 schools 
were under little pressure to comply during that decade.  Instead, educational 
institutions and other stakeholders in athletics responded to Title IX by 
mounting legislative and judicial challenges to the law’s scope.  These 
challenges began to pay off in the early 1980s, when lower courts began ruling 
that Title IX did not apply to athletic departments on the grounds that they do 
not directly receive federal funds38—a position the Supreme Court endorsed in 
1984.39  Although Congress eventually clarified the statute’s application to 
athletic departments within educational institutions receiving federal funds, for 
much of the 1980s, Title IX was off the table as a remedy for sex 
discrimination in college and high school athletics.40   
Yet even during this time, plaintiffs found ways to raise such claims.  For 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 71,418.  Courts have interpreted this provision to mean that “a disparity in one program 
component (i.e., scheduling of games and practice time) can alone constitute a Title IX violation if it 
is substantial enough in and of itself to deny equality of athletic opportunity to students of one sex at a 
school.”  McCormick ex rel. Geldwert v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 293 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
37. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (“A recipient . . . shall comply fully with this section as expeditiously 
as possible but in no event later than [July 21, 1978,] three years from the effective date of this 
regulation.”).    
38. See generally Univ. of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982); Othen v. Ann 
Arbor Sch. Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Grove City Coll. v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 
(W.D. Pa. 1980).  
39. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
40. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2011). 
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example, lawsuits against Washington State University and Temple University 
utilized a state constitution’s Equal Rights Amendment and the U.S. 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, respectively, to successfully challenge 
inferior funding, publicity, scholarships, facilities, equipment, coaching, 
uniforms, and other support provided by those universities to their women’s 
athletics program.41  Judicial enforcement of Title IX in college athletics 
accelerated in the 1990s, owing to Congress’s restoration of Title IX’s 
application to athletics in 1988 and a Supreme Court decision in 1992 that 
recognized a plaintiff’s right to pursue money damages for violations of Title 
IX.42  Thereafter, courts fielded complaints challenging unequal treatment at 
the college and high school level.  For instance, in one case from the 1990s, 
plaintiffs won a court order against the school board in Brevard County, 
Florida, to remediate the inequitable treatment of the girls softball team at 
Merritt Island High School in contrast to the boys baseball team, which had a 
lighted playing field, scoreboard, batting cage, superior bleachers, signs 
publicizing the team, bathroom facilities, and a concession stand, press box, 
 
41. See generally Blair v. Wash. State Univ., 740 P.2d 1379 (Wash. 1987) (en banc); Haffer v. 
Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1988), plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration granted, Civ. 
A. No. 80-1362, 1988 WL 3845 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 1988). 
In Blair, the trial court agreed and ordered WSU to allocate a specific and incrementally increasing 
percentage of overall athletic expenditures to the womens program, though it allowed the university 
to exclude expenditures for football from this calculation.  Blair, 740 P.2d at 1382.  On appeal, the 
Washington Supreme Court reversed the exclusion for football expenditures—”[T]he Equal Rights 
Amendment contains no exception for football”—though it allowed the university to incorporate 
football’s revenue and calculate the percentage target based on net expenditures.  Id. at 1383–85.  
In Haffer, public university Temple was obligated under the Equal Protection Clause to provide 
comparable treatment for mens and womens athletics, including equal access to practices and 
competitions, medical training, uniforms and equipment, travel accommodations and per diem 
coaching, tutoring, publicity, and recruiting.  After a federal district court denied Temple’s motion for 
summary judgment on these claims, the case settled with Temple agreeing to remedy the inequities 
cited in its case, including such things as awarding athletic scholarships to women in proportion to the 
womens participation in Temple’s athletic program, increasing the overall budget for womens sports, 
adding participation opportunities, and providing additional resources and staff to womens athletics.  
Christina A. Longo & Elizabeth F. Thoman, Haffer v. Temple University: A Reawakening of Gender 
Discrimination in Intercollegiate Athletics, 16 J.C. & U.L. 137, 148 (1989).  In addition to upholding 
the plaintiffs’ claims under the Equal Protection clause, the court also held that Grove City did not bar 
their claim that inequitable athletic scholarships violated Title IX because athletic scholarships were 
administered as part of the university’s financial aid program, which did receive federal funds.  
Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 537–38. 
42. See generally Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); see also Paul 
Anderson & Barbara Osborne, A Historical Review of Title IX Litigation, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
SPORT 127, 131 (2008) (pointing out results of an empirical study that 83% of the 190 cases involving 
Title IX’s application to athletics between 1972 and 2008 have been decided since 1990). 
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and announcer’s booth.43  In New York, a federal district court recognized that 
inferior treatment of the women’s hockey team at Colgate University, which 
resulted in part from the university’s refusal to elevate the women’s team to 
varsity status, violated the equal treatment mandate of Title IX.44  In addition 
to the courts, OCR, which received enforcement authority over Title IX when 
HEW was reorganized in 1979, also enforced Title IX’s equal treatment 
provisions during this time.  Though public enforcement of civil rights laws 
was generally lax in the 1980s,45 there is evidence that OCR resolved equal 
treatment cases in the 1990s.46  
Since the 1990s, litigation and administrative complaints challenging 
equal treatment in athletics have been amenable to several observations, which 
the rest of this Section will address in detail.  First, contemporary 
complainants and litigants are availing themselves of both public and private 
enforcement by seeking remedies through both the courts and OCR.  Second, 
their efforts predominantly target just a few program areas.  Third, in contrast 
to challenges of the equal opportunity variety, which have been directed 
towards inequities at the college level, equal treatment cases and complaints 
are targeting both high school and college athletics. 
1.  Public and Private Enforcement 
Those seeking remedies for unequal treatment utilize both public and 
 
43. Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., Fla. 985 F. Supp. 1458 (M.D. Fla. 1997).  The court 
rejected the school district’s defense that the inequities were the result of stronger booster-club 
support for boys baseball, explaining that by acquiescing to a system that relies on booster-club 
funding, the school district “is responsible for the consequences of that approach.”  Id. at 1462. In 
response to the ruling, the school district submitted a compliance plan that did not seek to improve the 
girls facility, but to achieve equality by prohibiting the boys team from using its amenities.  Catherine 
Pieronek, Title IX Beyond Thirty: A Review of Recent Developments, 30 J.C. & U.L. 75, 83–84 
(2003).  Sensing its retaliatory nature, and recognizing the “symbolic” discrimination that the 
noticeably unused amenities would invoke against the girls, the court rejected this plan in large part, 
refusing to let the board impose a “separate disadvantage” by punishing both girls and boys.  Id. at 84; 
see also R. Craig Wood & Luke M. Cornelius, Leveling the Playing Field: Title IX & Daniels v. 
School Board of Brevard County, Florida, 129 W. EDUC. L. REP. 19, 22–23 (1998). 
44. See generally Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).  On appeal, 
however, the decision was vacated as moot since the players had graduated.  Cook v. Colgate Univ., 
992 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir.1993).  
45. EQUAL PLAY, supra note 24, at 99–100. 
46. For instance, it was reported in a judicial decision on another claim that the plaintiff, a 
college volleyball player, dropped her equal treatment claim against Alabama State University 
because it was successfully resolved by OCR.  See Beasley v. Ala. State Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 
1332 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Beasley v. Ala. State Univ., 966 F. Supp. 1117 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (challenge 
to institution’s compliance with Title IX in the area of scholarships was dismissed as time-barred).   
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private enforcement measures.  Because Title IX does not require litigants to 
exhaust administrative remedies before going to court, many Title IX plaintiffs 
bypass OCR and seek judicial relief instead.  Others start with an 
administrative complaint and seek judicial remedies only if the administrative 
process fails to produce a satisfactory and enforceable remedy.  There are 
benefits and drawbacks to each method of enforcement.  To successfully 
maintain a lawsuit, the plaintiff must have standing—that is, he or she must 
actually experience the injury that he or she is seeking to remedy.  This limits 
the scope of equal treatment litigants to student-athletes and their parents filing 
on their behalf.47  In contrast, anyone can file an OCR complaint.  For 
example, in 2010 in Amherst, Massachusetts, a resident whose daughters were 
former students at Amherst Regional High School filed a complaint with OCR 
based on inequities he observed and he tried to remedy while his children were 
student-athletes there.48  Though his daughters had graduated, he was still able 
to file the complaint and successfully remedy the disparities.49  Additionally, 
OCR complaints can be filed anonymously, thus offering protection from 
retaliation.  Often the complainant is never publically known.  
Potential complainants, though, may not view public enforcement as 
equally effective or strong in comparison to a lawsuit for several reasons.  
First, OCR sometimes forgoes a site visit in exchange for the school’s promise 
to conduct its own investigation and report the results.50  Many believe that 
these internal investigations are not as effective at recognizing unequal 
treatment as an outside investigation from the OCR would have been.  OCR 
 
47. For example, in both Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1999) and Pederson 
v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000), courts dismissed equal treatment claims because the 
plaintiffs who filed them were not varsity athletes and, therefore, were not directly injured by the 
discriminatory treatment that they had alleged. 
48. Mike Wilkinson, Amherst Regional Corrects Gender Imbalance in Sports Scheduling, DAILY 
HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2011. 
49. Id. 
50. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, Long Fights for Sports Equity, Even with a Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 
28, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/sports/review-shows-title-ix-is-not-
significantly-enforced.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all. 
For a specific example, in the winter of 2009, OCR allowed the University of Alaska, Anchorage to 
conduct an internal investigation in response to a 2008 complaint filed with the agency that cited 
inequitable facilities, primarily locker rooms, access to quality coaching, and access to medical 
personnel.  Additionally, the university had to develop and submit a plan for remedying inequities.  
See Beth Bragg, UAA Group to Assess Title IX Complaint, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 31, 2009, 
available at http://www.adn.com/2009/01/30/v-printer/674140/uaa-group-to-assess-title-ix-complaint. 
html.  In the summer of 2009, the university announced that it was building additional locker rooms 
for their womens teams.  Josh Edge, Title IX Self Assessment Requires Locker Room Renovations, 
THE N. LIGHT, June 30, 2009, available at http://www.thenorthernlight.org/2009/06/30 
/titleixselfassessmentrequireslockerroomrenovations/ 
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investigations can be quite thorough.  For example, after the above-mentioned 
three-year investigation into inequities at Adrian College, OCR found 
violations in every program area.51 
Second, complaints offer relatively little control over the process of 
remediation.  Once someone files a complaint, OCR takes over the 
investigation, negotiation, and enforcement of the terms of the resolution 
agreement.  The complainant has little to no opportunity for further input.  
Finally, while OCR is authorized to penalize violations of Title IX with 
withdrawal of the institution’s federal funding, this penalty is a sort of 
“nuclear option” that OCR has never exercised.  Instead, it typically resolves 
complaints through resolution agreements that bind the offending institution to 
implement remedies by agreed-upon deadlines and to submit to monitoring by 
OCR until the violation is resolved.  A complainant seeking compensatory 
damages, therefore, would likely prefer private enforcement instead.  Even in 
equal treatment cases, where compensatory damages are likely to be small, 
judicial relief may include punitive damages where the equal treatment offense 
violates the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause as well as Title IX.  
Constitutional violations can be simultaneously pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983,52 a statute that provides access to punitive damages in egregious cases, 
in contrast to Title IX, which some jurisdictions have interpreted to disallow 
punitive damages.53   
Additionally, the remedy of attorneys’ fees and costs also makes litigation 
an effective choice, particularly when it is used against schools or associations 
that have been resistant to making changes and have already been put on 
notice for sometimes longstanding inequities.  For example, softball players 
sued the Alhambra Unified School District in California after failing in their 
internal efforts to challenge inequitable playing facilities, which included the 
construction of a multi-use athletic field that was not accessible to softball.54  
The case ultimately settled on the plaintiffs’ terms, including the district’s 
obligation to provide two new softball fields, new locker room facilities for 
female students, equal access to weight rooms and other facilities, more 
desirable practice and game times, equitable funding and fundraising 
 
51. Jesse, supra note 3. 
52. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 248–49 (2009).  
53. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Katrina A, Pohlman, Note, 
Have We Forgotten K-12? The Need for Punitive Damages to Improve Title IX Enforcement, 71 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 167, 168 (2009). 
54. Cruz ex rel. Cruz v. Alhambra Sch. Dist., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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opportunities, equitable publicity, enhanced coaching,55 and attorneys’ fees 
and costs.56  Similarly, in a case at the intercollegiate level, Slippery Rock 
University has had to answer for its treatment of female student-athletes in 
court multiple times.57  The case, which began in 2006, addressed both equal 
treatment and equal opportunities.58  The case settled in 2007, but the 
plaintiffs took the university back to court for potential violations of the 
settlement and for alleged retaliation against those involved in the lawsuit.59  
In 2010, the district court granted (at least in part) the students’ motion for 
attorneys’ fees and costs.60   
In yet one more example, litigation was effective at remedying unequal 
treatment inherent in the Michigan High School Athletic Association’s 
(MHSAA) nontraditional scheduling of six girls sports: volleyball in the 
winter (instead of the fall), basketball in the fall (instead of the winter), soccer 
in the spring (instead of the fall), golf in the spring (instead of the fall), 
swimming and diving in the fall (instead of the winter), and tennis in the fall 
(instead of the spring).61  A federal district court found that this practice 
violated Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and Michigan’s antidiscrimination law, and required MSHAA to devise a 
compliance plan that would equitably distribute the advantageous playing 
seasons.62  MHSAA appealed the district court’s ruling,63 but eventually, in 
 
55. Id. at 1187–88. 
56. Id. at 1201. 
57. See Choike v. Slippery Rock Univ., No. 2:06-cv-00622, 2006 WL 2060576 (W.D. Pa. July 
21, 2006) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
58. Id. at *6. 
59. Choike v. Slippery Rock Univ., No. 2:06-cv-00622, 2007 WL 2317323 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 
2007) (order affirming settlement); Rich Lord, 2 Women Cry ‘Foul’ in Lawsuit Against Slippery Rock 
University, POST-GAZETTE.COM (June 18, 2011), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11169/1154609-
54.stm#ixzz1amsJhiHV. 
60. Choike v. Slippery Rock Univ., No. 2:06-cv-00622, 2007 WL 3120097 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 
2007); Choike v. Slippery Rock Univ., No. 2:06-cv-00622, 2010 WL 4614610 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 
2010). 
61. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807 (W.D. Mich. 
2001); see also, generally, Chaudhry & Greenberger, supra note 15. 
62. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 862.  
63. On the case’s first trip to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the appellate panel affirmed the 
district court’s determination of MSHAA’s liability only under the Equal Protection Clause.  Cmtys. 
for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 377 F.3d 504, 515 (6th Cir. 2004).  MSHAA’s appeal 
from that decision raised the question—since resolved in another case Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. 
Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009)—of whether the Equal Protection Clause can provide an independent 
remedy to violations of Title IX.  See Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Cmtys. for Equity, 544 U.S. 
1012 (2005).  This required the Sixth Circuit to produce a second opinion on the matter, this time 
affirming the district court’s determination that MHSAA violated Title IX.  Cmtys. for Equity v. 
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2006, after nearly a decade of litigation, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court’s decision on Title IX, Equal Protection, and state 
law grounds.64  The court also required that MHSAA pay the multi-million 
dollar legal fees incurred by the plaintiffs.65 
2.  Program Areas of Particular Focus in Equal Treatment Cases 
Both complaints and lawsuits over unequal treatment have resulted in 
significant improvements in conditions for female student-athletes.  But the 
resolution agreement involving Adrian College, referenced above, which 
required the college to implement remedies in nearly all of Title IX’s program 
areas, is rare in its breadth of scope.  Instead, it seems more typical of 
contemporary equal treatment cases to focus primarily on inequitable facilities 
and inequitable scheduling.  Complaints that address multiple violations across 
several program areas, however, could be an emerging trend.  For example, in 
2011, a parent filed a complaint against Boiling Springs High School, alleging 
disparate treatment in terms of facilities, access to strength training, and 
uniform replacement rates.66  And in 2012, a federal judge in California 
concluded after trial that the class action plaintiffs had successfully proven that 
the Sweetwater Union School District violated Title IX’s requirement for 
equal access to facilities, equipment, scheduled games and practices, medical 
and training services, coaching, publicity, and promotional support.67  For 
reasons explored in the following Section, complaints and lawsuits regarding 
inequitable facilities have dominated the equal treatment cases.  Most of these 
cases have involved softball facilities, whose conditions and amenities are 
often compared to those of a school’s baseball team.68  When reporting on a 
 
Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 698–99 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1322 
(2007). 
64. Cmtys. for Equity, 459 F.3d at 676.  
65. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:98-CV-479, 2008 WL 906031, at 
*2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008); Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:98-CV-
479, 2008 WL 3834024 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 14, 2008).  
66. Robert W. Dalton, Boiling Springs High at Center of Probe on Discrimination Against 
Female Athletes, GOUPSTATE.COM (May 25, 2011) http://www.goupstate.com/article/20110525/ 
ARTICLES/105251015/1083/ARTICLES?p=1&tc=pg. 
67. Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., No. 07cv714-L (WMC), 2012 WL 424413 (S.D. 
Cal., Feb. 9, 2012) (findings of fact & conclusions of law). 
68. Because Title IX requires equity in the aggregate, inequities revealed in a two-sport 
comparison, even between sports that are often paired as “equivalent” sports, does not provide 
conclusive evidence of a violation.  But rarely does a school that provides favorable treatment to its 
boys baseball team make up for it by providing equal treatment to any other girls sport.  Baseball and 
softball comparisons, therefore, provide vivid and concrete examples of unequal treatment. 
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complaint about inferior softball fields at a high school in Virginia in 2009, the 
Washington Post reported that the case was one of forty-seven cases under 
OCR investigation for similar problems at that time.69  Since its inception in 
Fall 2006, the Title IX Blog has posted about dozens of high schools and 
colleges whose softball fields have been challenged under Title IX.70  Across 
America, it seems that softball fields are inferior to their counterpart boys’ 
facilities when it comes to such attributes as lighting, dugouts, soil and grass 
quality, foul poles, backstops, fences, regulation dimensions, restroom 
facilities for fans, locker rooms for players, concession stands, and distance 
from the school.  At one school, the softball outfield was used as an overflow 
parking lot for football games, a condition from which the baseball field was 
exempt due to its expensive irrigation system.71 
In many cases, particularly at the high school level, inequalities arise due 
to unmatched efforts of boys teams’ booster clubs, which often raise funds to 
pay for improvements to facilities, as well as providing other perks and 
amenities, such as equipment, supplies, travel, and awards.  For example, in 
2009, OCR received a complaint about the Lebanon School District in Oregon, 
where the booster club paid for a batting cage for the baseball team and raised 
funds for a team spring break trip to Arizona, amenities that were not provided 
in their equivalent to any girls teams.72  Woodbridge, Virginia,73 and Pitt 
County, North Carolina,74 are among additional communities where booster 
club spending has created unequal treatment for which school districts have 
had to answer. 
The courts and OCR have held the long-standing and consistent position 
that booster club funding for one sport does not absolve schools of their 
obligation to provide equal treatment.  For example, in a 1995 opinion letter, 
OCR expressed its concern that “private funds . . . , although neutral in 
principle, are likely to be subject to the same historical patterns that Title IX 
 
69. Michael Birnbaum, Woodbridge, Va., High School Ballfields Scrutinized for Sex 
Discrimination, WASH. POST, (July 20, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/07/19/AR2009071901429.html?nav=emailpage. 
70. See generally Erin Buzuvis & Kristine Newhall, TITLE IX BLOG, http://www.title-
ix.blogspot.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
71. Ellen Williams, Inequities in Girls’ Softball Brings Title IX Complaint, S. ALABAMIAN, Aug. 
23, 2007, at 2B. 
72. Jennifer Moody, Title IX Complaint Filed in Lebanon, DEMOCRATHERALD.COM (Nov. 27, 
2009), http://democratherald.com/sports/high-school/article_1680f6d2-db89-11de-ba46-001c 
c4c002e0.html. 
73. Birnbaum, supra note 69.  
74. Josh Humphries, Title IX Complaint Is Being Reviewed, DAILY REFLECTOR, Nov. 18, 2007. 
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was enacted to address.”75  Boys’ sports generally occupy a favored position 
in society that results in stronger public and parental support.  If a school could 
simply channel support for boys’ teams through private funds, Title IX’s equal 
treatment mandate “could be routinely undermined.”76  In the same vein, the 
federal district court that decided the Brevard County softball case, mentioned 
above, rejected the school district’s defense that the inequities were the result 
of stronger booster club support for boys baseball, explaining that by 
acquiescing to a system that relies on booster club funding, the school district 
“is responsible for the consequences of that approach.”77  Thus, OCR has 
made it clear that booster club fundraising on behalf of a particular team does 
not itself violate Title IX.  But a school that chooses to accept booster-raised 
funds as a donation toward the team maintains the obligation to provide equal 
treatment in the aggregate.  This may mean spending other money to provide 
commensurate treatment to a comparable number of girls.  In other districts, 
however, it has resulted in an overhaul to the way booster clubs are organized 
and overseen—as some have adopted “unified” booster clubs to ensure that 
private funds are not earmarked for any specific team.78  Yet judging by the 
frequency with which booster clubs are at the center of equal treatment 
complaints, it does not seem that this message has gotten through. 
Another precipitating factor for softball field inequities is a holdover from 
historic discrimination that excluded girls and women from sport until 
relatively recently.  By the time many schools added softball, perhaps in 
response to Title IX’s equal opportunity mandate, they had already dedicated 
all of the outdoor playing facilities on campus to sports like baseball, football, 
and soccer.  Lacking room for such facilities, schools have made arrangements 
to use off-campus locations, such as city parks, which may lack the amenities 
schools provide to their on-campus facilities, thus constituting unequal 
treatment.79  Sometimes, however, this explanation is too generous.  The 
 
75. Letter from John E. Palomino, Regional Civil Rights Director, to Karen Gilyard, Esq.,  
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud and Romo (Feb. 7, 1995), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/letters/jurupa.html. 
76. Id. 
77. Daniels, 985 F. Supp. at 1462.  
78. See, e.g., Elizabeth Celms, Title IX: Mercer Island School District Proposes Unified Booster 
Club, MERCER ISLAND REP., Nov. 19, 2008 (reporting on a school’s effort to create a unified booster 
club in order to resolve Title IX inequities revealed in a compliance review).   
79. For examples of Title IX complaints involving off-campus softball fields, see Complaint: 
Schools Unfair to Girls, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Mo.), Nov. 9, 2007, at A1; Rhiannon Meyers, 
GISD Settles Title IX Lawsuit, GALVESTON CNTY. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 16, 2007, available at 
http://galvestondailynews.com/story.lasso?ewcd=bf97a25cfb3551be&-
session=TheDailyNews:42F942220a223397EDoho30EAC42. 
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University of Charleston had a softball field, but converted it into a football 
field and moved the softball team to a city park.80  In addition, the school 
district in Chillicothe, Ohio, was threatened with enforcement by the 
American Civil Liberties Union before it decided to construct a permanent 
softball facility, siting it, however, at an elementary school two miles away 
from the high school campus.81  It is hard for schools to remedy inequalities in 
facilities that they do not own or control; but OCR and courts have 
consistently held that limitations of space and other resources do not absolve 
schools from their obligation to provide equal treatment.  To hold otherwise 
would be to allow the historic discriminatory exclusion of girls from sports to 
continue to disadvantage them today.  Schools have had to find creative 
solutions, including relocating their softball team to other fields, negotiating 
permission to set up portable locker rooms at city fields, contributing to 
improvements, or finding ways to share the burden of having to play off 
campus.   
Another equal treatment issue that traces back to the historic 
discriminatory exclusion of girls from sport is the inequitable scheduling of 
high school sports for girls and boys teams—both in terms of the season of the 
year and the night of the week on which games are held.  Title IX’s regulatory 
provision requires equal treatment in the “[s]cheduling of games and practice 
time[s].”82  The watershed case in this area83 was the lawsuit filed in 1997 by 
 
80. Veronica Nett, Ex-UC Student Files Title IX Complaint, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar. 15, 
2008, at 8A.  
81. Erin Buzuvis, Ohio School District Decides Location for Softball Field, TITLE IX BLOG 
(Mar. 11, 2010, 4:15 PM), http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2010/03/ohio-school-district-decides-
location.html. 
82. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(3). 
83. Communities for Equity was not the first or only lawsuit to address scheduling of seasons.  
One of the first scheduling cases was brought against the interscholastic athletic association in the 
State of Virginia (the Virginia High School League, or VHSL), which had consistent seasons for 
boys’ sports across the three divisions in which schools competed but varied the seasons for girls 
sports by division.  See generally Alston v. Va. High Sch. League, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 526 (W.D. 
Va. 1999).  In 1997, parents alleged that this constituted unequal treatment in violation of Title IX 
because a school’s reclassification to another division would often create conflicts for multi-sport 
female athletes but never for male athletes who played multiple sports.  Id. at 528–29.  The VHSL 
moved for summary judgment, challenging the application of Title IX on the grounds that it does not 
directly receive federal funds.  Id. at 529.  A federal district court denied this motion, ruling that the 
VHSL could be subject to Title IX if the plaintiffs established that in fact the member school districts, 
who are themselves subject to Title IX, have ceded their controlling authority of interscholastic 
athletics to VSHL.  Id. at 532.  The court also determined that a reasonable jury could find the alleged 
discrimination to be sufficiently “substantial” to constitute a violation of Title IX.  Id. at 536.  An 
earlier case from the 1980s included a challenge to the Montana High School Association’s 
scheduling of girls volleyball and girls basketball in their nontraditional season.  However, due to the 
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a parents’ group, Communities for Equity, against MHSAA.84  Like the 
schools that argued that they had no room to add softball facilities, MHSAA 
argued that there was no room in the existing schedule of seasons for girls 
sports when it started to sanction the sports in the 1970s.85  By MHSAA’s own 
admission, girls sports were “fitted around” the existing boys’ program in 
order to ensure that boys teams would not have to share facilities, officials, 
and coaches.86  In support of its conclusion that this practice violated Title IX 
(as well as the Equal Protection Clause and state law), the district court found 
that the nontraditional seasons disadvantaged girls in a variety of ways, 
including limiting their exposure to college recruiters, limiting their 
opportunities to participate in off-season development programs, precluding 
them from playing opponents or in tournaments in neighboring states, forcing 
them to choose between sports that they used to play in different seasons 
before they entered high school, and having to endure less-optimal weather 
conditions for spring sports.87 
In addition to these concrete harms, the court also accepted as harmful 
“the psychological message” sent to female athletes in Michigan that it is 
acceptable for the scheduling of sport seasons to inconvenience them but never 
their male peers.88  This “second-class” status can cause girls to internalize 
and accept an inferior status, can lower self-worth, and stigmatizes girls in the 
eyes of boys.89  This decision is not the only one in a scheduling context to 
recognize the stigmatizing potential of inferior treatment.  In a case 
challenging the decision of two school districts in New York to schedule their 
seasons for girls soccer in the spring, out of sync with most of the other 
schools in their division, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that 
“[s]cheduling the girls’ soccer season out of the championship game season 
sends a message to the girls on the teams that they are not expected to succeed 
and that the school does not value their athletic abilities as much as it values 
the abilities of the boys.” 90 
 
parties’ agreement to a settlement, the question of the schedule’s compliance with Title IX or the 
Equal Protection Clause was not directly before the court.  See Ridgeway v. Mont. High Sch. Ass’n, 
858 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Suzanne E. Eckes, Title IX and High School Opportunities: 
Issues of Equity on and in the Court, 21 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 175, 184–86 (2006). 
84. See Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 805. 
85. Id. at 815. 
86. Id.  
87. Id. at 817–20. 
88. Id. at 837.  
89. Id.  
90. McCormick, 370 F.3d at 295.  
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In both the Michigan and New York cases, courts rejected the respective 
defendants’ similar attempt to justify their schedules with concerns about the 
availability of facilities, coaches, and officials.  Both courts insisted that if 
facilities for a given sport are truly so limited that only boys or girls can use 
them in a given season, the fair thing to do is to share the burden equally 
between them. 91  MHSAA ultimately devised a burden-sharing plan in which 
some girls sports—volleyball, basketball, tennis, and golf—are now offered in 
their traditional seasons, girls swimming and diving remains in its 
nontraditional seasons, and some boys’ sports—golf and tennis—have also 
been moved to the nontraditional season.92  In contrast, the two New York 
school districts decided to comply by moving their girls soccer season 
permanently to the fall.93 
There has also been litigation and public enforcement in another variety of 
scheduling cases: those challenging the day or evening of the week in which 
competition is scheduled.  In 2012, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that several Indiana high schools violated Title IX by choosing to almost 
always schedule boys’ basketball games on “prime time” Friday nights, while 
relegating girls games to weeknights.94  The court recognized this as a 
substantial disparity because it imposed a greater obstacle on girls than boys to 
balance schoolwork and games, it limited the availability of fans to attend 
 
91. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (noting that MHSAA’s concern about facilities 
“would at most permit the MHSAA to schedule girls and boys teams in separate seasons, but the two 
sexes would have to split advantageous and disadvantageous sports equally.  It is clearly not equitable 
for girls to play in all of the disadvantageous seasons and for boys to play in none of them.”); 
McCormick, 370 F.3d at 302 (suggesting that the violation could be remedied either by moving the 
girls season to the traditional season or by alternating the burden between girls and boys in some 
other fashion such as alternating the years in which girls and boys play soccer in the fall). 
92. See Sports, MHSAA, http://www.mhsaa.com/sports/index.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).  
For simplicity, this description omits the scheduling of seasons for Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, 
where golf and tennis are reversed. 
93. In response to threats of lawsuit by the New York Civil Liberties Union, other holdout 
districts in New York City’s Public School League have done the same.  Mark Lelinwalla, Title IX 
Issue Has PSAL Girls Soccer Coaches Yearning for a Return to Spring Schedule, 
NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Oct. 4, 2010), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-10-04/sports/27077187_1 
_girls-soccer-coaches-spring.  This article describes the dissatisfaction of some current multisport 
athletes who are forced to choose between soccer and their other fall sport.  This dilemma was raised 
in McCormick as well.  The Second Circuit rejected that idea that “temporary” hardship for current 
students outweighed the permanent discrimination that would result if the schools could continue to 
schedule girls sports out of sync with the vast majority of the state on a permanent basis.  McCormick, 
370 F.2d at 298.  
94. See generally Parker v. Franklin Cnty. Cmty. Schs. Corp., No. 10-3595, slip op. (7th Cir. Jan. 
31, 2012). 
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games, and it sent a message that the girls team was “second class.”95  In 
another case, the complaint filed with OCR regarding disparate treatment in 
Amherst, Massachusetts, mentioned briefly above, led to the school district 
agreeing to schedule an equal number of “prime time” games and an equal 
number of games “under the lights” for girls and boys teams.96  Also this year, 
a high school league in Pennsylvania switched the nights for girls’ and boys’ 
basketball games midway through the season, so that each would have a 
similar number of Monday and Thursday and Tuesday and Friday night 
games.97  Reportedly, the league changed after a neighboring league was the 
subject of an OCR complaint for scheduling girls games only on Mondays and 
Thursdays.98 
3.  Equal Treatment Sought in Both High School and College Athletics 
In contrast to equal opportunity cases, which are primarily raised in the 
context of college athletics, equal treatment claims appear more equally 
distributed between the high school and college levels.  There are several 
possible explanations for this difference.  For one, Congress has required that 
colleges and universities annually submit data regarding the distribution of 
athletic opportunities to the Department of Education, but it currently makes 
no such requirements for K-12 schools.99  The availability of such data makes 
it easier to recognize and ultimately challenge disparities in opportunities at 
the college level.100  Because equal treatment cases are not as statistics-driven, 
the absence of data at the high school level does not suppress enforcement of 
equal treatment cases as it does in equal opportunity cases at the high school 
level. 
Although it is also possible that high schools are more likely than colleges 
to have equal treatment problems, a more probable explanation is that equal 
treatment violations are more likely to be challenged when they appear at the 
 
95. Id. at 24–25. 
96. Wilkinson, supra note 48.  
97. Changes Come to Schuylkill Schedule, REPUBLICANHERALD.COM (Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://republicanherald.com/sports/changes-come-to-schuylkill-schedule-1.1092950. 
98. Id. 
99. See Erin Buzuvis, 78 Idaho School Districts Named in Title IX Complaint, TITLE IX BLOG 
(July 12, 2011, 1:08 PM), http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2011/07/78-idaho-school-districts-named-
in.html. 
100. Recent filings of administrative complaints against school districts all over the country, such 
as those discussed in the sources cited at footnotes 111–113, infra (notes discussing the mass 
complaints in Oregon and Washington) however, suggest that equal opportunity cases at this level are 
likely on the rise. 
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high school level.  The concepts of fairness and equity at the high school level 
are less obscured by the increasing commercialization of intercollegiate 
athletics.  Because high school sports have not become “big business” in the 
way some intercollegiate programs have, there may be less tolerance among 
athletes, parents, coaches, and other stakeholders for special privileges that 
boys teams receive when they are not linked to the perception of profit that 
pervades men’s athletics at the college level. 
The fact of public intolerance to unequal treatment at the high school level 
appears to be supported by the media attention such claims receive.  For 
example, a lawsuit challenging the new field house at North Oldham High 
School in Kentucky, which was built almost exclusively for the football team, 
drew the attention of the local National Broadcasting Company (NBC) 
affiliate.101  Its video footage of the facility in question aired locally and was 
available on the station’s website.102  What has engendered this burgeoning 
recognition of unequal treatment and the subsequent advocacy is likely due to 
the multiple and intersecting conditions discussed in the following Section. 
III.  EXPLAINING THE INVISIBILITY OF TITLE IX’S EQUAL TREATMENT 
REQUIREMENT 
Forty years after Title IX’s passage, college and high school athletic 
departments still struggle with compliance.  Although violations to both equal 
opportunity and equal treatment mandates continue to occur, equal treatment 
violations are more likely to result from athletic administrators’ ignorance and 
misunderstanding about that aspect of the law.  It is probably not the case that 
equal treatment is under-enforced as compared to equal opportunities.  As the 
last Section explained, both categories of claims have been successfully 
litigated in the courts or enforced by OCR.  Therefore, to take the case of a 
college athletic department that constructs a multi-use facility without a 
women’s locker room, it seems more likely that it did not know that it would 
violate the law than that it knew that it would violate the law but did not fear 
enforcement.   
Also, unlike equal opportunity, equal treatment is not complicated by 
multiple prongs nor has it been the subject of numerous “clarifications.”  
Equal treatment is conceptually easier and consistent with the liberal discourse 
of equality that permeates American society.  In fact, equal treatment in 
 
101. Two Oldham Co. Schools Hit With Title IX Violation, LEX18.COM (Aug. 12, 2011), 
http://www.lex18.com/news/two-oldham-co-schools-hit-with-title-ix-violation. 
102. See id. 
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athletics is often assessed by a simple standard: if the male athletes had to 
switch places with female athletes, would they do so without complaint?  
Equal treatment violations are therefore probably less likely than equal 
opportunity cases to be the result of an administrator’s erroneous 
determinations of compliance.  To put this explanation in terms of the example 
from the Introduction to the Article, it seems more likely that Adrian College 
administrators did not consider whether a multi-use facility without a women’s 
locker room would violate the law than that they contemplated compliance and 
simply reached the wrong answer.  The primary reason for equal treatment’s 
invisibility is that equal opportunity has dominated the discourse about what it 
means for athletic administrators to comply with Title IX.  Paradoxically, it 
may be the case that equal treatment is, in a way, a victim of its own merit.  
For many reasons, equal treatment claims are not as controversial as equal 
opportunity claims, and thus do not appear to provoke backlash to a similar 
degree.  Without backlash, there is less public discourse.  This may also 
contribute to the mindset among many athletic administrators that their Title 
IX obligations begin and end with equal opportunity.   
In the past two decades, despite the abundance of equal treatment cases 
and the varying and sometimes significant costs of providing equal treatment, 
the controversy over how much it costs to provide a quality experience to girls 
and women has been minimal.  Arguments based on the economics of certain 
sports (i.e., which sports produce revenue) continue to factor into discussions 
of how to comply with the three-part test.  But these arguments fall away when 
schools are forced to remedy discrepancies and deficiencies in women’s 
programs.  Even when a school is experiencing financial hardship—as many 
have been in the 2000s—there has been no concerted effort on the part of 
men’s sports advocates, the general public, or school officials to excuse 
ongoing discrimination because of the poor economy.  School officials may 
blame the existing discrepancies on budget issues, but they do not attempt to 
get out of compliance, even when financial constraints remain the same.  
Conversely, Title IX’s equal opportunity mandate has been a target for 
backlash.  Advocacy groups have filed lawsuits challenging it on 
constitutional and other grounds, even though every appellate court since 
Cohen v. Brown University has continued to uphold the three-part test.103  
Activism has also generated political momentum to challenge, however, 
unsuccessfully, Title IX’s equal opportunity mandate, such as through 
congressional hearings in the 1990s and the Department of Education’s 
 
103. See, e.g., Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 
Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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Commission for Equal Opportunity in Athletics in the early 2000s.104  In the 
media, commentators blame Title IX for the demise of “minor” (non-revenue-
producing) men’s sports, rather than citing the profit-seeking, arms-race 
culture that has created the status of minor men’s sports in the first place.  On 
the internet, every blog, column, or news story about Title IX’s role in creating 
new opportunities for women and girls is targeted by a thread of public 
comments deriding the law and blaming it for destroying men’s wrestling, 
tennis, swimming, and others. 
One reason why equal treatment cases produce less backlash is that equal 
treatment is consistent with political liberalism and some of modern America’s 
core values: equality, individualism, the concept of a level playing field, and 
public funding of education.  Modern incarnations of the liberal philosophy 
that undergirds the United States’ political and judicial system are premised on 
formal equality.  Despite the often problematic nature of this system, the 
mostly undisputed notion that women and men, when similarly situated, 
should be treated equally allowed for the initial passage of Title IX105 and has 
since been able to stymie dissent in regard to equal treatment compliance.  
Further, there is little room within an equality discourse for an argument 
against equal treatment.  Schools would have great difficulty in justifying a 
discrepancy in, for example, the quality of the uniforms the boys and girls 
soccer teams respectively receive in an era when, according to the dominant 
discourse, women have gained nearly equal footing.  The growth in athletic 
opportunities for women and girls also insulates equal treatment arguments 
from a common retort to equal opportunity claims: that equal opportunity is 
inconsistent with formal equality principles because girls are not as interested 
in sports as boys and, therefore, deserve fewer opportunities.106 
Additionally, equal treatment claims may be more palatable because of 
their consistency with the increasing acceptance for formal equality in other 
contexts.  The political and popular culture continues to measure gender 
equality, largely in material terms such as wages, numbers of women in 
 
104. Buzuvis, supra note 14, at 834–36 (describing the Commission on Equal Opportunity in 
Athletics); see also Ellen J. Staurowsky, Blaming the Victim: Resistance in the Battle over Gender 
Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 194 (1996) (examining the May 9, 
1995 U.S. congressional oversight hearing of OCR and its enforcement of Title IX in athletic 
departments). 
105. Deborah L. Brake, Title IX as Pragmatic Feminism, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 513, 535–36 
(2007). 
106. This “relative interest” theory has been rejected in every case in which it was raised.  See, 
e.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir.1999); Boulahanis v. Bd. of 
Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 638–39 (7th Cir. 1999); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 174 (1st Cir. 
1996); Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1019 (S.D. Ohio 2001). 
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historically male occupations, and social and political rights, among other 
things.  Equal treatment provisions fit neatly into this measurement tool.  For 
example, women’s teams receive twenty-five dollars per diem when traveling; 
men’s teams receive the same.  Womens ice hockey team members receive ten 
university-provided sticks each season; men’s team members do as well. 
In contrast, equal opportunity claims challenge the paradigm of formal 
equality, making them less palatable to mainstream culture.  To opponents of 
the three-part test, Title IX is a quota system, and thus evokes intense debate 
similar to that over affirmative action in the United States.  In both contexts, it 
is assumed that a quota bestows on people opportunities that they do not 
deserve, which challenges and possibly subverts a system allegedly based on 
hard work and individualism.  It is un-American, opponents argue, to simply 
give historically discriminated-against-persons opportunities no matter the 
level of past discrimination.  Because men and women are (almost) equal now, 
they argue that there is no need for special treatment.  Misconceptions around 
affirmative action and so-called quota systems have entered into the Title IX 
debate as well, but only in equal opportunity situations. 
Another key difference between equal treatment and equal opportunity 
claims is that the inherent unfairness in unequal treatment is often more easily 
recognizable and sympathetic, and its victims are actual and known.  A parent 
whose athlete-son has better, safer, or otherwise more favorable playing 
conditions and amenities than his athlete-daughter can easily identify and label 
this for the discrimination that it is.  In contrast, equal opportunity claims often 
require the public to imagine a hypothetical or unknown victim: the girl who 
would be an athlete if she only had the opportunity.  Because this victim is not 
(necessarily) real, she does not invoke the same understanding, awareness, and 
sympathy as the victim of unequal treatment.  Instead, people resent creating 
opportunities for this abstract victim at the perceived expense of a real and 
concrete boy.  As a result, Title IX’s equal opportunity mandate is more 
controversial and thus more central in the public discourse about the law. 
This is not to say that it is wholly understood—both the general public and 
stakeholders in educational athletics alike are often confused about what the 
equal opportunity aspect of Title IX requires.  But people have at least a sense 
that Title IX has something to say about disproportionate opportunities.  A 
college athletic administrator who is considering adding a football team will 
probably at least inquire about the Title IX implications of such a decision 
from an equal opportunity standpoint.  But as noted, an administrator may not 
scrutinize a decision to allow booster-club funds to provide special treatment 
for the boys baseball team or to “fit” the girls teams schedule “around” the 
boys’ schedule.  Though the unequal treatment is obvious to anyone who sees 
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the schedule or notices that only men play under the lights, the university’s 
legal obligation to remedy or prevent unequal treatment seems less so. 
Yet another reason why equal treatment claims may not be as 
controversial is that they do not challenge the hegemonic masculinity of sport 
in the way that equal opportunity claims do.  As feminist sport scholars have 
explained, sport plays a significant role in maintaining a gender hierarchy that 
privileges men.107  On a symbolic level, sport reflects and transmits shared 
cultural values associated with leadership and power.  When sport is 
“impervious to the inclusion of women,”108 it contributes to the cultural 
internalization of leadership and power as uniquely masculine traits.  While 
the law’s forcing equal treatment for female athletes is certainly destabilizing 
to the patriarchy, its forcing equal opportunity is a more direct threat.  For one, 
the fact of women playing sports makes it harder to limit the association of 
power and strength with masculinity only.109  For another, schools’ decisions 
to comply with equal opportunity by reducing opportunities for men has 
created the widespread perception that equal opportunity is a zero-sum game, 
that women’s opportunities come at the direct expense of men’s. 
A final explanation for the prevalence of equal treatment cases, but the 
lack of public discourse about equal treatment in school-sponsored sports, is 
that so many of the cases have, in the past decade or so, been in high schools.  
Section II provided two possible explanations for this trend.  But these trends 
also affect visibility of equal treatment violations.  Because high school sports 
are generally of interest only to the local community, publicity over 
inequitable treatment receives only local attention.  There is little national 
consideration given to these issues, which in the aggregate seem substantial, 
but when reported on by a town’s local newspaper, they seem to be only 
isolated incidents.  Additionally, because of the general public’s belief that 
society is now post-feminist, and thus in a post-Title IX era marked by near-
equality, seeing such violations as anything but isolated incidents would 
threaten this belief.  Also, the amateurism principle, which operates more 
 
107. Janet S. Fink & Donna L. Pastore, Diversity in Sport? Utilizing the Business Literature to 
Devise a Comprehensive Framework of Diversity Initiatives, 51 QUEST 310, 311 (1999); Mary Jo 
Kane, Leadership, Sport, and Gender, in WOMEN ON POWER: LEADERSHIP REDEFINED 114, 115 (Sue 
J. M. Freeman et al. eds., 2001); Carole Oglesby, Intersections: Women’s Sport Leadership and 
Feminist Praxis, in WOMEN ON POWER: LEADERSHIP REDEFINED, supra, at 292; Nancy Theberge, 
Gender, Work, and Power: The Case of Women in Coaching, 15 CAN. J. OF SOC. 59, 62 (1990). 
108. Oglesby, supra note 107, at 292. 
109. Of course, it is not suggested that women playing sport eliminates this association.  Society 
has not yet arrived at the post-patriarchy, as attested to by the media’s tendency to marginalize, 
trivialize, and sexualize womens sports.  Even still, Title IX has transformed society by providing a 
counter-narrative to the view of sport as a male enclave.  
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strongly in high school sports than in college sports, is much more compatible 
with equal treatment, because in an amateur environment, Title IX claims at 
that level cannot be framed as a threat to profitability as they are when 
challenging sex discrimination in college sports. 
Thus, for several reasons discussed in this Section, the comparatively 
more controversial nature of Title IX’s equal opportunity requirement causes it 
to dominate the public discourse with regard to Title IX.  In contrast, equal 
treatment issues fail to provoke such ire.  Equal treatment is consistent with 
liberal political philosophy, comparatively less-challenging to hegemonic 
masculinity and, often, because it frequently arises in the high school setting, 
compatible with amateur values of sport.  Thus, even claims that threaten 
resources for boys’ and men’s sports, such as those with implications for 
booster clubs and sharing “prime time” use of facilities, while not universally 
embraced, are not vilified to the extent that equal opportunity claims are.  
Although some equal treatment defendants have dug in their heels, for 
example, MHSA and the Brevard County School District, none have 
challenged the validity of equal treatment or have used political influence to 
convene congressional hearings or regulatory commissions seeking reform.  
Even equal treatment cases that produced remedies of considerable costs, such 
as those of Adrian College and the Chillicothe, Ohio school district, have not 
triggered a public outcry against Title IX.  As a consequence, public 
awareness about the equal treatment aspect of Title IX does not extend beyond 
the institutions, students, and other local stakeholders affected by the case.  
This ignorance allows existing violations to continue and new violations to 
occur. 
IV.  RAISING AWARENESS AND PROMOTING COMPLIANCE 
The previous Section explored reasons for the relative invisibility of Title 
IX’s equal treatment mandate.  The goal of this Section is to use those reasons 
as the basis for recommendations aimed at improving awareness about Title 
IX’s equal treatment mandate and, in turn, compliance. 
A.  Awareness and Enforcement 
As described above, the public plays a crucial role in Title IX 
enforcement, both by using the courts for private enforcement and by 
triggering public enforcement by OCR.  It is therefore imperative that 
members of the public who are potential complainants, whether they be 
students, parents, coaches, or community members, realize that Title IX covers 
more than an equal number of opportunities and requires the remediation of 
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inequities between male and female athletic teams.   
Lately, there have been several examples of strategic, high-volume, 
complaint filing by advocacy groups and (apparent) unaffiliated individuals.  
Earlier this year, for example, the National Women’s Law Center filed twelve 
administrative complaints against twelve school districts located in each of 
OCR’s twelve compliance regions.110  These complaints, which generated 
both national and local media coverage,111 challenged gross disparities in the 
number of athletic opportunities for girls and boys and alleged noncompliance 
with each of the three prongs of 1979 Policy Interpretation’s test for 
measuring equal opportunity.  Since then, an anonymous individual(s) has 
filed complaints against dozens of school districts and hundreds of high 
schools in the states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and California.112  Like 
the National Women’s Law Center’s complaints, these mass filings only allege 
violations with the three-part test and equal opportunity.113  These mass filings 
have also generated much attention for the lack of Title IX compliance at the 
high school level.  Even as OCR has found grounds to dismiss these 
complaints,114 each contributed to raising awareness about Title IX’s 
requirement for equal opportunity.  Although advocates and activists might 
understandably prioritize equal opportunity enforcement—not having 
opportunities at all is a worse injustice than not having opportunities of equal 
quality—the consequence of omitting equal treatment from these highly 
visible enforcement campaigns could make it more difficult for girls and 
 
110. Katie Thomas, Women’s Group Cites 12 Districts in Title IX Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
11, 2010, at B18. 
111. Jane Ann Morrison, It Looks Like School District Isn’t Playing Fair with Girls Sports, LAS 
VEGAS REV. J., Oct. 17, 2011, at 1B; Michael Carvell, Title IX Figures Come up Short, ATLANTA J. 
& CONST., Nov. 11, 2010, at C2; Jenny Dial, HISD Cited in Title IX Complaints, HOUS. CHRON., 
Nov. 11, 2010; Jeffery Javier, Feds Investigate Title IX Complaint vs. DV Unified, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Mar. 4, 2011, at 4; Javier Serna, Wake Co. Faces Title IX Probe, NEWS OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), 
Jan. 6, 2011; Jennifer Smith Richards, Girls’ Access Called Unequal, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 
11, 2010, at 1B; Josh Verges, Title IX Investigation Advances: U.S. Agency Examining Gender Equity 
in Sioux Falls, 11 Other School Districts, ARGUS LEADER, (Sioux Falls, SD), Feb. 27, 2011; Dan 
Albano, Title IX Complaint Filed against Irvine Schools, OCVARSITY.COM (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://www.ocvarsity.com/articles/girls-23537-sports-irvine.html. 
112. See, e.g., Wendy Owen, Oregon Schools Failing to Give Girls Equal Opportunity to Play 
Sports, Complaint Says, OREGONIAN, June 28, 2011; Kevin Gaboury, 100 Idaho Schools Face Title 
IX Complaints, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (Idaho), July 13, 2011; Jacques Von Lunen, Area Schools 
Face Civil Discrimination Complaint, BELLINGHAM HERALD (Wash.), Mar. 18, 2011. 
113. See, e.g., Wendy Owen, supra note 112; Gaboury, supra note 112; Von Lunen, supra note 
112. 
114. Wendy Owen, Feds Won’t Pursue Title IX Civil Rights Complaint Against Oregon Schools, 
Says Attorney, OREGONIAN, Oct. 10, 2011; Kira M. Cox, Washington State Under Review for Title IX 
Compliance, BELLINGHAM HERALD (Wash.), May 3, 2011. 
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women to secure both equal opportunity and equal treatment in the long run.  
Advocates and activists should, therefore, endeavor to include equal treatment 
claims in these campaigns.   
OCR could also promote awareness of the equal treatment components of 
Title IX by making it the subject of clarification.  Since the 1979 Policy 
Interpretation, equal opportunity obligations have been the subject of multiple 
policy clarifications and “Dear Colleague” letters,115 yet the agency has not 
used this approach to raise awareness of an educational institution’s equal 
treatment obligations.  This is despite the high volume of cases and other 
reports of such institutions’ failure to, one, provide female student-athletes 
equal access to facilities and, two, fully understand the inequities produced by 
booster club funds.  Either of these issues (or both) seems a ripe topic for an 
agency’s “clarification” that could also serve as a general reminder about the 
equal treatment requirement overall. 
B.  Awareness and Reporting 
Another strategy that could help raise awareness about Title IX’s equal 
treatment mandate is the inclusion of indicia of equal treatment in existing and 
pending disclosure legislation.  The Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act 
(EADA) requires colleges and universities subject to Title IX to report 
information about the athletic opportunities that they provide to the OCR116 on 
 
115. See, e.g., Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Clarification of Intercollegiate 
Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 
16, 1996), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html (providing further 
clarification of the three-part test); Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Further 
Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance, OFFICE 
FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/ list/ocr/title9guidanceFinal.html (emphasizing the flexibility of the three-part test and the 
agency’s disfavor of compliance by contraction); James F. Manning, Delegated the Authority of the 
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. (Mar. 17, 2005), available at http://www.nacua.org/documents/AddnClarification 
InterCollegiateAthleticsPolicy.pdf (allowing universities to demonstrate compliance with prong three 
by administering an interest survey); Letter from Margaret Spellings, Sec’y of Educ. to Steven 
Geoffrey Gieseler, Pac. Legal Found. (Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www2.ed.gov 
/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/title-ix-2008-0327.pdf (re-affirming the application of the three-part test 
to high school athletics); Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague 
Letter: Athletic Activities Counted for Title IX Compliance, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr /letters/colleague-
20080917.html (clarifying how OCR determines which athletic activities can be counted under the 
three-part test); Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, OFFICE 
FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (April 4, 2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf (rescinding the interest survey policy).  
116. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (2011); see also 34 C.F.R. § 668.47 (2011). 
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an annual basis.  OCR, in turn, makes this information available to the public 
in an online format.117  Schools are required to report the number of 
opportunities available to male and female athletes as well as the gender 
breakdown of the student body as a whole.118  Accordingly, potential plaintiffs 
and complainants can use that information as a way to evaluate the school’s 
compliance with Title IX’s equal opportunity mandate.119  Anyone who 
reviews an institution’s EADA disclosure can quickly surmise the institution’s 
compliance with the proportionality prong of the three-part test and can also 
use this information as the basis for assessing its compliance with both prongs 
two and three.120  Next, because a school must report athletic-related student 
aid, its EADA disclosure can also serve as the basis for assessing whether that 
institution complies with the requirement that athletic scholarship dollars be 
distributed proportionally to the percentage of athletic opportunities for each 
gender.   
In contrast to equal opportunity and scholarships, EADA disclosures are 
considerably less-useful in assessing an institution’s compliance with its equal 
treatment obligations.  Schools must report total expenditures and revenues for 
each sport by gender, as well as game-day expenses and recruiting 
expenses.121  But these reporting obligations do not break down expenses by 
the program areas of the equal treatment laundry list, except for recruiting, 
which is not one of the nine program components listed in Title IX’s equal 
treatment regulation, but is a recognized “other factor.”122  Although a 
 
117. See The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool, OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY 
EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
118. See id. 
119. Of course, colleges and universities can make it more challenging for the public to use 
EADA reports to promote enforcement by manipulating participation data to give the appearance of 
proportionality.  See, e.g., Katie Thomas, College Teams, Relying on Deception, Undermine Gender 
Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at A1.  
120. Compliance with proportionality is apparent on the face of an EADA report, as one simply 
needs to convert the total number of male and female students to their respective percentages, convert 
the total number of athletic opportunities for each sex to their respective percentages, and compare 
whether the percentage of athletic opportunities for each sex is similar to the percentage of students of 
each sex in the student body.  Compliance with prong two can also be assessed by examining EADA 
reports over time for evidence that the institution has a “history and continuing practice” of expanding 
opportunities for the underrepresented sex.  EADA data do not provide direct evidence of unmet 
interests for the underrepresented sex, which is measured by prong three, but because it identifies 
which sports an institution does and does not offer, it can suggest the possibility of unmet interest 
when compared to others in that institution’s conference or other evidence of likely interest in a 
particular sport.  
121. See The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool, supra note 117. 
122. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)–(10). 
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disparity in total expenditures by gender may signal possible inequities at the 
program level, evidence of a disparity in aggregate expenditures does not itself 
promote public enforcement of Title IX’s requirement of equal treatment, 
especially in light of the regulatory provision stating “[u]nequal aggregate 
expenditures for members of each sex . . . will not constitute 
noncompliance.”123 
In light of the ways that EADA reporting continues to push equal 
treatment off the collective radar, EADA reform presents another opportunity 
to raise the profile of the equal treatment obligations and violations.  Congress 
could modify the reporting requirements in such a way as to make equal 
treatment compliance as assessable as compliance with the equal opportunity 
requirement and scholarship regulation.  Because compliance is not measured 
by dollars spent, but by overall “availability, quality and kinds of benefits, 
opportunities, and treatment afforded members of both sexes,”124 such reform 
would require implementation of a qualitative assessment tool to measure 
equal treatment.  Perhaps it could follow the model of the NCAA’s Self-Study 
Instrument, which has required125 Division I institutions to assess compliance 
with the various program requirements incorporated in Title IX’s equal 
treatment mandate.126 
C.  Awareness Through Member Certification and Education 
The NCAA’s requirement that member institutions internally assess 
compliance with gender equity and Title IX raises, more generally, the 
potential of the NCAA (and, by extension, its counterparts for community 
colleges, the National Junior College Athletic Association, and for high 
schools, such as the National Federation of State High School Associations 
and its member associations) to serve as another context in which the relative 
invisibility of equal treatment can be addressed.  Because these are private 
organizations, they have the power to determine membership based on their 
 
123. Id. § 106.41(c). 
124. See 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 12.  
125. In April 2011, the Division I Board of Directors decided to suspend the current athletics 
certification program for two years, pending a review aimed at improving the process by reducing 
redundant reporting obligations and streamlining certification for institutions that do not have a 
problem complying with gender equity or other areas measured by the certification process self-study 
instrument.  Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Board Directs Alternative Approach to Division I Certification, 
NCAA (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest 
+News/2011/April/Board+directs+alternative+approach+to+Division+I+certification.  
126. 2010–11 NCAA DIVISION I ATHLETICS CERTIFICATION SELF-STUDY INSTRUMENT (2010–
2011).  
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own compliance standards.  As mentioned, the NCAA has required its largest 
member institutions, those in Division I, to internally assess—as a condition 
for membership—their compliance with the NCAA’s gender equity 
requirement that overlaps with Title IX.  Division II and III members are also 
expected to engage in self-study, but they are not required to submit them to 
the NCAA as a condition for membership.  The NCAA’s self-study instrument 
is one of the few requirements on educational institutions to assess compliance 
with the program areas incorporated into Title IX’s equal treatment mandate.  
To complete the instrument, the institution must gather quantitative and 
qualitative data—through methods such as interviews of coaches and 
athletes—to assess whether the athletic department engages in equal treatment 
in the aggregate.  This process forces an institution to focus on equal treatment 
as a component of Title IX and has the potential to raise awareness, at least 
among the self-study participants, about an institution’s obligations to provide 
equivalent benefits and amenities to male and female athletes. 
As such, the NCAA Division I Board of Directors’ decision this year to 
suspend the certification self-study for two years pending reform raises 
concern.  The reform efforts’ stated goal of streamlining the certification 
process for those institutions that meet dashboard indicators of compliance127 
could be a particular setback to equal treatment compliance precisely because 
equal treatment cannot be measured on a dashboard.  Because of the nature of 
the requirement, participation rates, and financial reports, the kinds of data that 
can be easily gathered and reported cannot be used to assess whether the 
institution provides equivalent benefits to athletes of both sexes in specific 
areas of access to facilities, scheduling of competition, uniforms and 
equipment, publicity, coaching, and the rest of the program areas. 
Outside of the self-study requirements that the NCAA imposes on its 
members, the NCAA has the potential to combat the relative invisibility of 
Title IX’s equal treatment requirement in additional ways.  Others have 
recommended that the NCAA improve coaches’ Title IX literacy by 
promoting the expectation or requirement that coaches engage in professional 
development, such as workshops and seminars, related to Title IX, like they 
already do for other issues like cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), diet and 
nutrition counseling, fundraising, individual sport skills, sexual harassment, 
stress management, and student life.128  Currently, the NCAA offers an 
extensive and comprehensive Title IX training at its Gender Equity Issues 
Forum every year, which provides good coverage of Title IX’s equal treatment 
 
127. Hosick, supra note 125.  
128. Staurowsky & Weight, supra note 13. 
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mandate.129  However, the time and expense of attending such a conference 
usually requires institutions to limit participation to the athletic department’s 
Senior Woman Administrator, or otherwise a small delegation of coaches or 
administrators.  Few, if any, send their entire coaching staff.  If a professional 
development expectation arose for all coaches, it would be imperative that this 
training carve out the time and devote itself to equal treatment issues, 
notwithstanding participants’ desires to vet (and vent) the more controversial 
equal opportunity aspect of Title IX. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As shown in this Article, Title IX’s equal treatment requirement is often 
successfully enforced by plaintiffs and complainants; yet, awareness about this 
aspect of the law is relatively low, eclipsed by the more complex and 
controversial equal opportunity requirement.  Equal opportunity, although a 
target for backlash, at least does not have to work to keep itself on the public 
radar.  In contrast, Title IX advocates and other stakeholders in athletics 
should be conscientious about raising the profile and the stakes of equal 
treatment and, in this way, ensure that both aspects of Title IX are fully 
realized. 
 
 
129. Erin Buzuvis, NCAA Gender Equity Issues Forum, TITLE IX BLOG (May 3, 2011, 11:05 
AM), http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2011/05/ncaa-gender-equity-issues-forum.html. 
